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All the ideas for 'The Nature of Things', 'The View from Nowhere' and 'Outlines of Pyrrhonism'

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67 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
There is more insight in fundamental perplexity about problems than in their supposed solutions [Nagel]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophy is the childhood of the intellect, and a culture can't skip it [Nagel]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
It seems mad, but the aim of philosophy is to climb outside of our own minds [Nagel]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
You cannot divide anything into many parts, because after the first division you are no longer dividing the original [Sext.Empiricus]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Views are objective if they don't rely on a person's character, social position or species [Nagel]
Things cause perceptions, properties have other effects, hence we reach a 'view from nowhere' [Nagel, by Reiss/Sprenger]
Realism invites scepticism because it claims to be objective [Nagel]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
Proof moves from agreed premises to a non-evident inference [Sext.Empiricus]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
A class is natural when everybody can spot further members of it [Quinton]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 8. Material Implication
A valid hypothetical syllogism is 'that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood' [Sext.Empiricus]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 7. Paradoxes of Time
Since Socrates either died when he was alive (a contradiction) or died when he was dead (meaningless), he didn't die [Sext.Empiricus]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
Extreme nominalists say all classification is arbitrary convention [Quinton]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
The naturalness of a class depends as much on the observers as on the objects [Quinton]
Properties imply natural classes which can be picked out by everybody [Quinton]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
Uninstantiated properties must be defined using the instantiated ones [Quinton]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
An individual is a union of a group of qualities and a position [Quinton, by Campbell,K]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
If an argument has an absurd conclusion, we should not assent to the absurdity, but avoid the absurd argument [Sext.Empiricus]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / c. Representative realism
Whether honey is essentially sweet may be doubted, as it is a matter of judgement rather than appearance [Sext.Empiricus]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Modern science depends on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities [Nagel]
We achieve objectivity by dropping secondary qualities, to focus on structural primary qualities [Nagel]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
How can the intellect know if sensation is reliable if it doesn't directly see external objects? [Sext.Empiricus]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
We distinguish ambiguities by seeing what is useful [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
Epistemology is centrally about what we should believe, not the definition of knowledge [Nagel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
The basis of scepticism is the claim that every proposition has an equal opposing proposition [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
The necks of doves appear different in colour depending on the angle of viewing [Sext.Empiricus]
The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand [Sext.Empiricus]
If we press the side of an eyeball, objects appear a different shape [Sext.Empiricus]
The same oar seems bent in water and straight when out of it [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Scepticism is based on ideas which scepticism makes impossible [Nagel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
How can we judge between our impressions and those of other animals, when we ourselves are involved? [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
If we enjoy different things, presumably we receive different impressions [Sext.Empiricus]
Some actions seem shameful when sober but not when drunk [Sext.Empiricus]
If we had no hearing or sight, we would assume no sound or sight exists, so there may be unsensed qualities [Sext.Empiricus]
Sickness is perfectly natural to the sick, so their natural perceptions should carry some weight [Sext.Empiricus]
Water that seems lukewarm can seem very hot on inflamed skin [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
With us it is shameful for men to wear earrings, but among Syrians it is considered noble [Sext.Empiricus]
Even if all known nations agree on a practice, there may be unknown nations which disagree [Sext.Empiricus]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
If you don't view every particular, you may miss the one which disproves your universal induction [Sext.Empiricus]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Observed regularities are only predictable if we assume hidden necessity [Nagel]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
Personal identity cannot be fully known a priori [Nagel]
The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity [Nagel]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 4. Split Consciousness
I can't even conceive of my brain being split in two [Nagel]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
If we utter three steps of a logical argument, they never exist together [Sext.Empiricus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
Total objectivity can't see value, but it sees many people with values [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
We don't worry about the time before we were born the way we worry about death [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
If our own life lacks meaning, devotion to others won't give it meaning [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Pain doesn't have a further property of badness; it gives a reason for its avoidance [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Something may be 'rational' either because it is required or because it is acceptable [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
If cockroaches can't think about their actions, they have no duties [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
If we can decide how to live after stepping outside of ourselves, we have the basis of a moral theory [Nagel]
We should see others' viewpoints, but not lose touch with our own values [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
We find new motives by discovering reasons for action different from our preexisting motives [Nagel]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
Utilitarianism is too demanding [Nagel]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Some say that causes are physical, some say not [Sext.Empiricus]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
If there were no causes then everything would have been randomly produced by everything [Sext.Empiricus]
Knowing an effect results from a cause means knowing that the cause belongs with the effect, which is circular [Sext.Empiricus]
Cause can't exist before effect, or exist at the same time, so it doesn't exist [Sext.Empiricus]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Causes are either equal to the effect, or they link equally with other causes, or they contribute slightly [Sext.Empiricus]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Does the original self-mover push itself from behind, or pull itself from in front? [Sext.Empiricus]
If time and place are infinitely divided, it becomes impossible for movement ever to begin [Sext.Empiricus]
If all atoms, times and places are the same, everything should move with equal velocity [Sext.Empiricus]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
If motion and rest are abolished, so is time [Sext.Empiricus]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
Time must be unlimited, but past and present can't be non-existent, and can't be now, so time does not exist [Sext.Empiricus]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / c. Intervals
How can time be divisible if we can't compare one length of time with another? [Sext.Empiricus]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
How can we agree on the concept of God, unless we agree on his substance or form or place? [Sext.Empiricus]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
The existence of God can't be self-evident or everyone would have agreed on it, so it needs demonstration [Sext.Empiricus]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil
If God foresaw evil he would presumably prevent it, and if he only foresees some things, why those things? [Sext.Empiricus]